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I argue that the presence of subjective, qualitative consciousness in our world is - at first sight
maybe surprisingly - related with ontological complexities surrounding measurement in quantum
theory. Both issues can be cleared up by a suitable redefinition of the notion of observer - by
equipping them with subjective ontology and waving goodbye to the global one, covering “the whole
reality”.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of subjectivity, or the problem of mind
and body, is well established in philosophy. The lit-
erature devoted to it is abundant, however, it is also
highly differentiated regarding quality. With a bit of
luck, one may find brilliant observations there, sup-
ported by careful and detailed analysis. At the same
time, the topic belongs to those unfortunate ones on
which so many so vague publications appeared (an-
other one would be the quantum measurement prob-
lem). To make the situation more complicated - it
seems so hopelessly difficult for many science-oriented
researchers to contrast it with the physical knowledge
about the world that they simply deny the problem’s
existence. I do my best to approach the issue seriously
here, by being neither too philosophical, nor too con-
servative about it. The resulting perspective is quite
original, I guess.
To formulate the problem as sharply as possible, I
take its source, i.e. subjective consciousness [12], not
as awareness, not as merely a state of neuronal tissue
investigated in a well-equipped lab, or any other as-
pect of a more or less avoiding approach, but as a set of
qualitative, apparently physically irreducible entities,
usually called qualia. That is maybe a bit simplistic,
since the structure of consciousness is immensely rich,
but it is not the functional side that causes the prob-
lem - it is the material. Moreover, taking functional
aspects of consciousness into account can completely
obscure the main point.
That there indeed is a subjective qualitative aspect
of our lives which cannot be ignored was noted
perhaps in an uncountable number of publications. If
I were to choose some standard - and contemporary
at the same time - references, these would be a
classic paper “What is it like to be a bat?” [1] by
Thomas Nagel, and “The Conscious Mind” [2], a book
by David Chalmers, where he referred to the hard
problem of consciousness.
Perhaps the most serious issue with qualia is that
they do not seem to go well with current physics.
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Adding non-physical layers by hand at this point is, in
my opinion, not the best way out, since it introduces
more complications than the subjective-objective re-
lation itself. I believe that the right path to follow
is to look for unused space in conceptual structure of
current physical theories. One of the pillars of mod-
ern physics, the quantum theory, is known to offer a
significant supply of this resource, a few serious philo-
sophical puzzles included. Below I argue that one of
them, the measurement problem, shares very much
with the issue of subjectivity, being related to some of
the most fundamental physical notions - observation.
There are lots of good arguments in favor of irre-
ducibility of qualia (see, for instance, [2]), there is
one good for their reducibility - that physics demands
it. So far, there have been numerous discussions re-
lated to the former ones, but perhaps none conclusive.
Building on them is a risky game - it is easy to drown
in an ocean of nuances. It is not my intention to ignore
all that has been done so far [13], but it seems much
easier to start from scratch, especially for the reader.
The same is true for interpretations of the quantum
formalism - I do not describe any of the standard ones
here.
I begin by briefly recalling why existence of sub-
jectivity poses a problem for our current physicalistic
understanding of the world. I then switch to a review
of canonical arguments contra reductionism. Next, I
elaborate a bit on our notion of existence, arguing that
it actually does not point that much at what it is usu-
ally assumed to - i.e. entities inhabiting an objective
reality. I then show how this is related to the problem
of other minds and how it allows for an approximate-
only physical reductionism, something what quantum
mechanics seems to have been whispering about from
its very beginning [8]. Finally, I discuss how all this is
connected with conceptual problems related to obser-
vation and measurement in quantum theory, known
for containing a strange mixture of ontology and epis-
temology.
II. WHY SUBJECTIVITY IS A PROBLEM
Assuming intuitive, objective Newtonian physics, as
is usually done in consciousness research, the main
problem with subjectivity and qualia is that their role
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physically redundant, since brain behavior apparently
explains everything there is to explain about function-
ing of the mechanism of perception. Why would there
need to be some strange impression of greenness in the
world if there already exists a physically well-behaved
network of neurons?
If one insists that existence of qualia is in some sense
natural, the only reasonable way out seems to be prov-
ing their physical reducibility to neuronal functions.
This, however, is in no way more feasible than explain-
ing why they exist at all - there is a kind of explanatory
gap here (the very term goes back to [3]). The problem
is that whenever one tries or is somehow forced to ex-
plain qualia in terms of any established or even imag-
inable physical machinery, they sooner or later start
to look inconceivable - instead of a bridge between the
canonical domain of physical theories and the habitat
of qualia, one encounters a conceptual void.
Let us take a look at some thought experiments
making this statement more evident. My review of
claims against reducibility of phenomenal conscious-
ness to brain behavior follows a short orthodox list.
There is a well-known argument about logical possi-
bility of philosophical zombies [2], there is an old one
about inverted qualitative spectrum [4, 5], there is also
the story of Mary the super-scientist [6], and the one
already mentioned - the “what is it like to be” argu-
ment [1]. I report them very briefly, just to define
a point of reference - in case the reader had doubts
about their soundness, I strongly encourage them to
go through the literature collected in [2].
A. Philosophical zombies
The reasoning behind zombies is the most direct one
on the list about what I mentioned at the beginning of
this section - that qualia seem completely redundant
in the light of brain functions. It is conceivable, so
the argument goes, that there exist physically identi-
cal copies of us without any kind of subjective, qual-
itative consciousness - no sensations, no feelings etc.
If one admits that behavior of neurons is enough to
explain the functioning of perception, which I accept
here beyond any doubt, this mere observation seems
to prove that qualia do not play any role at all.
B. Inverted spectrum
The spectrum argument is in a sense very much
similar to the story of zombies. Here, however, a sub-
jective phenomenal perception and a brain are con-
trasted with an identical brain, but a consciousness
with altered qualia, specifically inverted color spec-
trum. Since occurrence of such a scenario in the real
world seems conceivable, it is natural to ask: how
are qualia related to physics, if in principle there is a
many-to-one relation between them?
C. Mary the super-scientist
This one often goes under the name of the knowl-
edge argument. Imagine a lab, organized in such a
way that a scientist occupying it for a lifetime - Mary
by convention - perceives everything monochromati-
cally. At the same time, she is a world-class specialist
regarding human vision and physics of light. Tech-
nically, she knows in great detail what happens in a
human brain when light of a given wavelength (say
red) impinges on a healthy human eye. Yet, as the
reasoning goes, she still does not know in what way
a red quale is different from the monochromatic ones
she is familiar with.
D. What is it like to be
This is perhaps the easiest of the arguments from
the list to capture, making it a very powerful one
- if imagining other people’s qualia might seem
conceivable, at least to a zeroth approximation, it
is almost certainly impossible in the case of bat’s
sonar. It encourages one to think that there is an
indispensable element of subjectivity in our world,
since objective science cannot reach all of reality.
Each of these arguments seems quite plausible -
there is certainly a fair amount of qualitative sub-
jectivity in us. On the other hand, however, there
is physics with an apparently different attitude. In
the light of current scientific knowledge it would be
unnatural to assume that consciousness is something
more than just a physical structure. What a scientist
usually does at this point is questioning the common
sense and assuming that somehow, in more or less dis-
tant future, qualia will be explained by neuroscience.
With such attitude, however, it is easy to reach a -
ridiculous from an intuitive point of view - conclusion
that qualia are just an illusion.
The two positions, each one seemingly correct, have
been competing for a long time in the literature.
Pushing argumentation in any of these directions,
however, is not likely to give any real progress. In
such a paradoxical situation what might help is a
redefinition of a basic notion quietly assumed to be
valid. Two such notions emerge very naturally in the
present context: reductionism, because qualia seem
irreducible, and observation, since the qualitative is
the subjective at the same time. In some sense fortu-
nately, exactly the same two notions cause problems
in current physics. Reductionism - because no matter
how many elementary quantum objects one glues to-
gether, Newtonian physics (or the classical limit of the
quantum formalism) is not reached by this procedure
alone [8], observation - because the mysterious jump
from quantum fuzziness to sharply defined physical
quantities (the famous collapse of the quantum state)
seems to be present only in one’s consciousness. Let
us start with the latter one, but before we do that -
3let us take a closer look at the concept of existence.
Its reconsideration turns out to be crucial for making
sense of qualia and for coping with measurement in
our fundamental physics.
III. THE NOTIONS OF EXISTENCE
AND OBSERVATION
In the context of a given state of subjective con-
sciousness, to exist is perhaps the most fundamental
notion I have (forgive me, please, this egocentrism -
with first-person perspective it is easier to maintain
clarity of the following). Yet, it is not necessarily obvi-
ous what it actually refers to. Not going too much into
details for the moment, let me adopt a variant closest
to my instantaneous subjective experience. Intuitively
then, its scope are objects I see in my private visual
space, thoughts I have, my other sensations, feelings
etc. The term “experience” is not accidental, since
what I most privately treat as existence is actually an
experience of existence. These two are indistinguish-
able for entities like thoughts and feelings, but it is a
bit more complex with spatial objects. Here, I visu-
ally experience only some parts of an object, imagin-
ing that the rest exists hidden from my sight. I can
cure that, however, by acknowledging the latter exis-
tence to be in fact an extrapolation of the mentioned
experience of existence (this is quite easily verified by
intuition). I recognize, thus, that in fact the expe-
rience comes first - it captures the essence of being,
while the other, a bit more general, notion of exis-
tence is only its derivative, living in imagination.
Going on, it is easy to notice that, taken as such,
existence goes away together with consciousness - if I
die, my sense of existence of my surroundings, inhab-
iting my consciousness, is sure to disappear. Now, if
I demand that content of consciousness is to be com-
pletely encoded in brain behavior through an isomor-
phism, an immediate conclusion is that this existence
has to be, for lack of better words, a kind of “thought”,
for only then can it be a part of the neural mechanism
[14]. I conclude that I do not experience objective ex-
istence of entities living outside consciousness, I just
have “thoughts” that something exists (more correctly
- I have experiences of existence), and this something
exists inside my consciousness. To give an illustration
in the visual space - if I see a 300-kilogram piggy, on
the edge of sanity, charging in my direction, because
I hold a bucket with food, this piggy exists for me at
most in my subjective visual consciousness.
Nevertheless, I tend to give the notion of existence
an objective character. This manifests itself in two
contexts. Firstly, there is a generalization of the one
involving the difference between existence and expe-
rience of existence, mentioned above. If I close my
eyes, then imagine - in an appropriate way - time evo-
lution of an object I was looking at the moment be-
fore and open them again, my imagination will match
the new state of this object. Because of that, I can
very easily construct a world objective in character,
still quite clearly made of qualia, which I experience
and explore everyday. Let us ascribe to it, for an ob-
vious reason, existence-even-when-I-do-not-look. The
other, stronger in a sense, context arises if I admit
phenomena which seem to turn the simple world con-
structed in the previous sentences into a conceptual
model of an “outer”, “real” and independent one, in
which consciousness is immersed. These can be a loss
of awareness, a damage or inherent limit of senses
etc. - everything that forces me to rely heavily on
my more or less abstract imagination. If I am flu-
ent enough in using the latter and have enough time,
I can obtain in this way a conceptual structure that
is traditionally described by Newtonian physics (we
will switch to quantum theory later on, when it is
needed). One should be careful, though, in promoting
this construction to a model of reality, as it is usually
done. In accordance with our discussion, the exis-
tence of, for instance, objects living in space created
by my visual imagination from primitive sensory data
is only a derivative of the notion of subjective experi-
ence of existence, not a world’s existence per se. For
the common sense this extrapolation is not necessarily
harmful, whereas it prohibits proper understanding of
subjective consciousness, as will become clear until I
finish my argumentation.
The above can be compressed in the following way.
In its cleanest form, existence for me is de facto the
subjective experience of existence. The latter applies
to entities given in real time, like a sensation of a
uniform visual field, of a sound, like a thought, a feel-
ing etc. This experience can be imagined, and in such
form it is what I usually call existence. In other words,
all the meanings of the word “existence” I can think
of are derived from imagined experience of existence
with more or less effort. Two possible contexts come
here to mind immediately. The first one - when I
complicate a bit the visual field by introducing spa-
tial objects. Since I can have a visual sensation of
only a side of an object, the (experience of) existence
of others is imagined. This is what I called existence-
even-when-I-do-not-look. The second context arises if
I try to introduce a world completely independent of
my consciousness (in the previous case it was not so
- the unseen sides of objects were potentially in my
visual field). Or, if I try to define an ontology outside
my consciousness. This seems risky for I can easily
verify that I model existence in this outer world on
my subjective experience of existence. Thus, I give up
the idea and agree to treat what I thought would be an
external ontology (our physical model of the world) as
an elaborate conceptual structure still only inhabiting
my imagination.
From now on, let us call the hypothetical “true”,
“real”, “external” to consciousness (and possibly also
objective) ontology physical, while the one from the
above conceptual model either quasi-objective or
subjective physical.
Let us now take a look at consequences of the above
reasoning for the notion of observer. Consciousness
4is traditionally, i.e. if one treats quasi-objective as
physical, thought to contain images of surrounding
objects (particularly its visual part). Its ontological
layer, it follows, should be considered common with
an objective world - like it is for a mirror and objects it
reflects. That is, an observer is traditionally convinced
that their consciousness is a part of an objective world.
Or, the traditional observer is able in some sense to
reach outside their consciousness, since they logically
separate perceived objects and their images. On a
closer look, however, this ought to be at odds with
the very definition of consciousness understood as a
source of knowledge - for it should be the only thing
at the disposal of an observer. If we now combine this
with the argument from the previous paragraphs, we
arrive at a conclusion that subjective consciousness
itself should define ontology for an observer (perhaps
an “observer” now). That is, due to their own nature,
they should not be able to reach any kind of truly
objective ontology, external to their consciousness.
Such a statement can seem quite problematic, how-
ever, at least for three reasons:
• physics is assumed to postulate a common on-
tology (if one completely ignores quantum pecu-
liarities),
• we intuitively think there is an ontology to share
between various observers,
• a situation with different notions of existence
(pertaining to different agents) seems incompre-
hensible.
Despite a conflict with intuition, there is a way to pro-
ceed. Firstly, we need to agree, along the lines of what
has been said so far, that none of us has access to phys-
ical ontology, whatever it might be. Secondly, we need
to give each observer their own ontology, which they
treat as true. It looks as if there was “real” physics
- on the conceptual side very different from what we
are used to, and unreachable for us - such strange
that it was able to create a mind with an impression
of existence. Agreed, this potentially produces a cer-
tain logical uneasiness - existence is on the one hand
treated as artificial (it is not the physical one), on the
other it has to be in some sense real (it is the only
one an observer has). In order to avoid it, we have to
redefine our traditional notion of physical ontology -
it should now be taken as the subjective physical one,
whereas its old location should be left blank. In other
words, existence I have at my disposal is not a “true”
existence of things in a reality completely independent
of my consciousness, it is only created by my mind for
its purposes.
Something like a common ontological layer is nec-
essary in order for the notion of observation to be
strictly applicable. If a theory lacks one, a single ob-
ject cannot be connected with numerous observers,
and room is left for each of them having their own
object in their subjective perception. Why then do
we have a tendency to construct a global ontology
common to all observers? Why is there observation
at all? The reason is precisely the mistaking of quasi-
objective ontology for physical one. Such a misleading
picture can arise only because my own consciousness
has a “brainy” representation within itself - only this
allows me to place all minds (through corresponding
brains), including my own, on an equal footing, by
introducing a global view. I am then easily inclined
to think that me and other agents all have access to,
or observe (specifically through subjective conscious-
ness), the very same set of items - our surroundings.
However, this can quickly collapse, because the global
ontology I have just introduced is neither objective,
nor “true” - it is quite easy for me to realize, if I recall
the previous paragraphs, that it is actually my quasi-
objective or subjective physical ontology. Thus, there
is no common playground for different “observers”,
moreover - they never share objects between their on-
tologies (this point will be crucial later on, when we
come to quantum theory). A consequence is that - in
accordance with intuition - it does not make sense to
ask about other people’s or animals’ qualia, for they
belong to different ontologies. If they were to be com-
pared, this could be possible only from the point of
view of physical ontology, which we do not have ac-
cess to.
To finish the story, we have to say a few more words
about the status of quasi-objective ontology in brain.
First of all, observe that in the picture at hand ontol-
ogy within a given subjective consciousness, mapped
to its brain through neural correlates, has to be com-
pletely different from the one of the brain itself, i.e.
its building blocks. Neurons produce a notion of exis-
tence, but this existence is not about objects standing
next to the brain - rather about virtual, internal to
perception, objects created by itself, only correlated
with the outer ones in the just constructed global
view. In other words, not only an image occurs in
perception - this image has also its own “abstract” or
“artificial” ontology, having nothing to do with any
ontology of neurons [15]. This is obvious if one trans-
lates the identification of existence with experience of
existence through the mind-brain isomorphism.
It is very tempting now to ask where does “we” come
from, since the subjective is naturally limited to “me”.
How is it possible for me to talk with someone else
about their subjective consciousness if I cannot ver-
ify its existence? It makes sense simply because I do
not need qualia of another person in order to talk
about their subjective consciousness - it is represented
in my consciousness through their brain, or through
a virtual world created by their neural network. It
is there that I can find a correlate of - artificial for
me - existence of some subjective entity inhabiting
someone else’s perception and consciousness. What-
ever (empirically correct) they say about their qualia
is reflected in behavior of their brain, it thus becomes
obvious that it does not matter if I have access to
these qualia. They can be “inverted”, for instance,
and this still would not matter for anything in my
understanding of the world, my communication with
5these agents and so on. It is like other brains defined
my point of view on other people’s minds - if they ap-
pear to me as brains, not as sets of their qualia, so
be it. In the end, these brains are only parts of my
subjective ontology, not a true physical one. In the
same manner, it is also meaningless to ask if one can
ascribe qualia to other physical entities than brains.
“We” is thus something present only in each quasi-
objective or even-when-I-do-not-look ontology. As a
side remark, since we do not have access to physi-
cal ontology, the very notion of observation changes
its meaning. We may call ourselves observers only be-
cause each subjective perception is represented within
itself as surrounded by something it apparently mir-
rors (or is correlated with in certain manner, to be
precise).
This is a good moment to consider physical re-
ducibility of qualia. The problem can be formulated
both in terms of a possible physical ontology, as well
as a subjective physical one. As for the first option -
qualia cannot be reducible to any real physical ontol-
ogy simply because we do not have access to it, i.e.
we cannot formulate any elaborate arguments with the
help of it. As for the second one, recall that brain does
not recognize objects around it as elements of ontol-
ogy - it does so for mental constructions living inside
perception, which are mental mirrors of these objects.
Thus, my own perception, which is my consciousness
seen inside itself, seems to define a “false” ontology,
which I will never agree to identify with the subjective
one - my proper, fundamental ontology. Put differ-
ently, in order for the reduction to take place I would
have to consider my own subjective ontology artificial.
That is a strong reason to reject reducibility of sub-
jective perception to brain behavior - what one can
hope for at most is a functional isomorphism between
the two.
IV. CONSEQUENCES FOR PHYSICS
Such a substantial change in understanding of on-
tology must have serious conceptual implications for
physics. Fortunately, it turns out that it rather fixes
existing problems than causes new ones.
A. Relation with physical reductionism
Quantum theory is known very well to have arisen
in order to explain behavior of atoms and elementary
particles - in other words, to make physical reduction-
ism more solid than it used to be before. Some time
ago I argued [8] that the need to introduce the col-
lapse of the quantum state signals a problem exactly
with reductionism. However contradictory these two
approaches might seem, it is not difficult to reconcile
them.
If I take an appropriate number of elementary quan-
tum objects and glue them in order to form atoms,
then molecules, then more complicated pieces of mat-
ter, I expect to obtain, in the end, a classical macro-
scopic object. This never happens by itself, as indi-
cated by the quantum formalism - I need to apply the
collapse at some point in order for the big object to
gain definite properties [16]. Adopting a top-down
approach, one might say that the smaller the con-
stituents of matter, encountered on subsequent layers
of material organization, the less well-defined they are
in terms of ontological definiteness - as if the ontology
was gradually dissolving (to be precise, what is dis-
solving is the Newtonian quasi-objective one). As a
consequence, quantum theory is defined by its classi-
cal limit [7], not the other way round, as one might
expect.
An ontology defined on the macroscopic level, like
the one constructed inside subjective perception, is
exactly the missing part of the picture. The well-
defined, top level is governed by objective, observer-
independent classical physics, while the remote, quan-
tum one is in principle allowed to be ontologically de-
formed, for nothing is in fact built on top of it - re-
ductionism in terms of Hilbert space can be defined
only relative to the classical level, which is established
independently. In other words, we have subspaces for
quantum particles because we observe quantum par-
ticles while being on the macroscopic level. The clas-
sical world is thus only quasi-reductionistic - its re-
ductionism is apparent, albeit quite convincing on the
macrolevel.
Such deformation, or dissolving, is conceivable if
one accepts that subjective ontology is not a physical
one (recall how we defined the term “physical” above).
One could imagine a situation in which it was, for
instance, somehow emergent, but this emergence was
not visible in consciousness due to its being (forever)
insensitive to a “deeper level”.
B. The measurement problem
The measurement problem is closely related with
the notion of observer. Its standard formulation, how-
ever, exposes a difficulty arising when we want to treat
measurement as an ordinary interaction, engineered
by us to extract information about an object.
Let me give a simple illustration (for an introduc-
tion to the formalism of quantum theory and its de-
scription of measurement the reader is referred to [9]).
Consider states |si〉 of a quantum system S and states
|aj〉 of a measuring apparatus A, with a “ready” state,
|a0〉. If A can measure S, then there exists a unitary
operator U with the following property:
|si〉|a0〉 U−→ |si〉|ai〉 (1)








Since measurement should be an interaction like any
other (these are unitary for isolated quantum sys-
tems), we should be able to stop at this point. It is far
6from clear, however, that one can treat the right-hand
side of (2) ontologically as a result of measurement -
neither the apparatus, nor the object is in a definite
state. Only after performing an appropriate projec-
tion, ∑
i
αi|si〉|ai〉 Pj−→ |sj〉|aj〉, (3)
can one finish the whole procedure. When exactly
to apply Pj in an experiment and what kind of phe-
nomenon it corresponds to is not indicated by quan-
tum theory.
Moreover, quantum measurement involves creation
rather than uncovering of properties. The reason
is that quantum superposition, from which measure-
ment picks an option, is not the same as statistical
mixture. This is perhaps most lucid in the famous
double-slit experiment where lack of measurement al-
lows for quantum interference. Overall, it is as if mea-
surement was in part pushed from the domain of epis-
temology to the ontological one.
What is considered a measuring apparatus in the
above scenario is not precisely defined - it can be a
bunch of particles, large enough to be on the edge of
the macrolevel, but also an enormous piece of labora-
tory gear. Thus, the cut (as Heisenberg would say)
between the quantum and the classical can be freely
shifted over a wide range. Nothing prevents us, in
principle, from including human observer as the last
element of the measuring chain (this was done by von
Neumann [10] and Wigner [11] long time ago, but in a
different context). Now, this is exactly what is needed
to relate the measurement problem with the whole
reasoning of this paper. As soon as the influence of
the measured (or rather “measured”) object arrives to
my brain, I can connect the quantum formalism with a
particular state of my subjective perception by neural
correlates and pick the right element of the quantum
superposition [17]. The reason why we have to wait
until the brain is included in the process is that quan-
tum theory does not allow us to use the objective,
classical existence strictly. That forces us to make
predictions for the only well-defined layer there is left,
i.e. direct consciousness and its derivatives from imag-
ination. An impatient researcher could actually locate
the cut a bit earlier, already when the signal reaches
the macroscopic level, and before the observer is in-
cluded, because mechanisms like decoherence allow it
for practical purposes, or - because quasi-objectivity
and approximate reductionism are “saturated” enough
at this earlier stage. In principle, however, this is not
correct, since our physics is not fundamentally, strictly
reductionistic in the ontological sense.
C. Wigner’s friend
The above problem can be given a different face, as
in the “Wigner’s friend” thought experiment [11]. As-
sume we have two measurement processes. The first
one, as above, includes a measured quantum object
and an observer (it is crucial to have a human this
time). Imagine now that we treat them as an isolated
quantum system (close them in a hermetic room) and
include an external human observer in the picture -
this would be the second measurement process. From
the point of view of the first observer, the state of the
measured quantum object may be perfectly definite,
while for the second one the whole system inside the
room may be in a quantum superposition. One can
now ask, loosely speaking, who is right regarding the
state of the object, for it is different in the two cases
(in the latter one a pure state for this object is not
defined, since it is entangled with its measuring ap-
paratus). This paradox is very well explained by the
assumption that each observer has their own ontol-
ogy. If both of them are not physical, but subjectively
physical, meaning the observers do not share objects
between their ontologies, such a difference in points of
view is perfectly acceptable - for, in the light of the
previous sections, our physics is distributed over dif-
ferent subjective ontologies. Of course, after opening
the room, the external observer would have to apply
the collapse. This would, however, just put both ob-
servers into agreement verifiable by them from their
minds [18].
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Objective ontology, accompanied by observation,
is certainly a very natural ingredient of our view of
physics. Nevertheless, this notion is based on a con-
venient modification of the quasi-objective one, which
is purely a domain of our subjective sensory data and
imagination - our notion of existence is only a deriva-
tive of a subjective state that might be called “experi-
ence of existence”. If we draw a conclusion that there
really are some objects outside subjective conscious-
ness in any sense, it is only because we introduce by
hand a “true”, global ontology and identify the sub-
jective with brain behavior, what forces us to consider
physical surroundings of the mind. Contrary to this
picture, however, one actually never claims existence
of one’s consciousness. If I say “my consciousness ex-
ists” it means “a visual content exists” or “a set of
auditory sensations exists” - it is a statement about
something inside consciousness. We never consider ex-
istence of consciousness as a whole (this would be the
“true” physical existence), but concentrate on the one
which points at its content or a theoretical model.
This means that each agent has their own ontology,
either inaccessible by others (if it is looked upon as
a set of qualia), or artificial for them (if it is seen as
brain behavior). These ontologies do not share ob-
jects between themselves, but at the same time are
not independent. Very loosely speaking, it is like a
collection of different movies, with plots taking place
in distinct worlds, but similar [19]. The usual location
of the global ontology is, however, left empty.
Qualia are naturally not reducible to anything
7“external” in such setting, for they belong to their
own, separate reality in case of each consciousness.
This can be treated as the price we pay for having
perception (understood generally, as a mechanism,
not as brain behavior) which is a higher-order struc-
ture in terms to which we do not have access.
Whereas for a random physicist claiming that the
notion of observer is not well-defined in the scope
of quantum theory is acceptable, questioning reduc-
tionism, even to a slightest degree, is automatically
a heresy. The fact that this theory is so reliable
on the practical side often leads people to ignore or
ridicule its conceptual issues. On the other hand,
more science-oriented researchers involved in philos-
ophy of consciousness quite often do not have partic-
ular interest in physics, thus they know about reduc-
tionism what fellow scientists tell them - that it is
“scientifically proven”. For some of them things like
qualia have to be strictly reducible to brain behavior,
because “according to physics” everything has to be
reducible to behavior of elementary particles. Well,
physics has its own conceptual issues.
The reasoning presented in this paper touches the
notion of physical reductionism only where experi-
ment does not reach. This means that it is rather
based on rearranging of some notions than interfering
with formal structure of a physical theory and chang-
ing its predictions through that. Quantum theory is
still what it used to be - reductionistic to exactly the
same degree as before, but it has only been stressed
that this reductionism should be understood relative
to an independently (although not infinitely precisely)
defined macroscopic level.
Of course, the role of the observer in quantum
theory is now much more clear - everything in physics
has to be related to an observer’s consciousness, since
it defines their ontology.
Let us finally comment on the meaning of this
work’s main conclusions in the light of existing points
of view on consciousness. First of all, there is no prob-
lem of choice between monism and dualism - a parti-
tion into matter and mind comes in a different flavor.
Qualia are fundamental elements of subjective ontol-
ogy, and on them we build - with the help of imag-
ination - an “objective” world (to a zeroth approxi-
mation it is the given spatio-temporal world together
with “private” elements, like thoughts and feelings, to
a first approximation - the world known from Newto-
nian physics, also living only in our imagination, and
gradually dissolving in the microscopic realm). What
we call matter then is a derivative of qualia in a sense.
This implies that subjective consciousness is not built
from a “separate material”, and there is no need to
consider its possible interactions with matter (inter-
actionism, epiphenomenalism and so on).
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